scientific perspectives C oexistence predates the deployment of GM crops. It has been used successfully for many years to preserve the purity of pedigreed seed stocks and specialty non-GM crops, allowing different cultivars of even highly-outcrossing species to be grown in close proximity (Ramessar et al., 2010) . Ideally, coexistence measures prevent economic loss and give consumers and farmers the practical choice of growing or buying conventional, organic, or GM crops or derived products. Coexistence among GM, conventional, and organic crop production systems came to the forefront in 2003 with publication by the European Union (EU) of recommended guidelines for developing national policies by member states (European Commission, 2003 , 2010 . The recommendation specifically addresses authorized GM crops for which food and environmental safety have been established.
The EU coexistence policy follows social, economic, or legal principles of precaution, subsidiarity (i.e., coexistence policies decided by individual member states), polluter pays (i.e., expost liability: possible costs that arise after farmers have planted GM crops) borne by the GM farmer, proportionality, safeguarding existing standards, and cooperation (Beckmann, 2011) .
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ABSTRACT
The biological and agronomic sensibility of exante coexistence measures used in different parts of the world is reviewed. These measures need to be commensurate with the biology of the crop and the genetically modified (GM) adventitious presence (Ap) labeling thresholds imposed by government or industry. Excessive and inflexible measures or establishment of artificially low thresholds are not consistent with the intent of recommendations, namely to provide growers and consumers with practical choices. In the case study of portugal, few ex-post liability claims have been made and GM thresholds have rarely exceeded 0.9%. Giving farmers more flexibility or decision-making ability in the 'who, what, where, and how' of implementing coexistence measures has been successful. Knowledge and experience gained in coexistence worldwide should inform and strengthen future measures or policies. As such, regular monitoring, analysis, and reporting of the efficiency and effectiveness of coexistence measures worldwide would be a useful mechanism for iterative learning and adaptation. Excessive and scientifically unjustifiable measures need to be weeded out.
Coexistence compliance is independently legislated in 15 member states (Rodríguez-Cerezo, 2011) . In the ideal world, coexistence should be feasible and flexible through communication and cooperation among neighbors, economic incentives for high-value crops, quality control and co-ordination by seed companies and grain merchants through contract production, and segregation or blending of products for specific markets. Preventative measures to reduce the adventitious (unintentional) presence of foreign germplasm have been established through an iterative process and scientific validation, including the following: the use of certified seed, spatial isolation of crop fields or pollen barriers, crop rotations, volunteer control, field inspections, strategic harvest order, cleaning of agricultural machinery, and record-keeping. However, coexistence is often associated primarily with spatial isolation of crop fields.
FiXATioN oN iSolATioN diSTANCE
Flexibility in ex-ante coexistence regulations (i.e., GM farmers must follow them if they want to plant GM crops), which specify preventive on-farm measures to meet compliance with the 0.9% tolerance threshold for approved GM material in non-GM crop products and their implementation by EU member states have been urged by various (European) authors (e.g., , 2010a , 2010b , Devos et al., 2014 . Ex-ante coexistence measures by EU member states can encompass different approaches, including isolation distance only (a fixed minimum distance between GM and non-GM crop fields of the same species), isolation distances or pollen barriers (buffer zones), or private agreements among farmers that may include coexistence measure(s) being contracted to non-GM growers (Devos et al., 2014) . In reality, isolation distances are the only coexistence measure proposed by several EU member states (European Commission, 2006) . Isolation distance has been the most contentious method used to mitigate GM pollen flow. Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) corn (Zea mays L.) is the only GM crop grown on a significant area in the EU since 1998. The top five EU countries growing Bt corn are Spain (0.13 million ha), Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia (< 0.05 million ha each) ( James, 2015) . Isolation distances (GM to conventional cultivars) in Spain and Czech Republic are 50 and 70 m, respectively, whereas 200 m is stipulated in Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia (Table 1) . For grain corn, isolation distances range from 25 to 600 m (there is no coexistence law in Italy; Chiarabolli, 2011) , with 200 m frequently being stipulated (Table 1) . Devos et al. (2008a Devos et al. ( , 2009 Devos et al. ( , 2014 state that large and fixed isolation distances around GM corn fields, such as the 600 m specified by Bulgaria and Luxembourg, are (i) excessive from a scientific standpoint, (ii) difficult to implement, (iii) rarely proportional to the regional heterogeneity in the agricultural landscape, and (iv) not proportional to the farmers' basic economic incentives for coexistence. In general, isolation distances for GM vs. non-GM coexistence are significantly greater than those for conventional or organic identity preservation (IP) systems with lower tolerance thresholds (Ramessar et al., 2010) . Isolation distance regulations in many member states' policies clearly discriminate against smaller farms (Skevas et al., 2009; Beckmann et al., 2010) . The implementation of heterogeneous coexistence measures, most notably isolation distances, among member states suggests that the decision-making process was not strictly sciencebased (e.g., Ramessar et al., 2010) .
Were these distances based on the results of pollen flow studies conducted in each country or agroecoregion? In most research studies, an isolation distance of 50 m or less was sufficient to comply with a tolerance threshold of 0.5%, allowing for other potential sources of adventitious presence (AP) (e.g., planted seed impurities or unintentional seed admixture in farm machinery or during transportation and storage) while still remaining below the legal threshold (Devos et al., 2005 (Devos et al., , 2008b Messeguer et al., 2006; Beckie and Hall, 2008; Sanvido et al., 2008 , Marceau et al., 2013 . The European Coexistence Bureau best practice document for the coexistence of GM corn with conventional and organic farming did not recommend isolation distances beyond 50 m, with the use of pollen barriers as an option (Czarnak-Klos and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 2010) . Therefore, it is puzzling why many member states do not adopt coexistence policy recommendations from the European Coexistence Bureau, which was established in 2008 by the European Commission (EC).
Flexibility-in-regulation proponents (within Europe) argue that farmers should have the option of using pollen barriers instead of isolation distances, which would encourage (or perhaps more accurately, not discourage) the adoption of GM crop technology by farmers Demont and Devos, 2008; Devos et al., 2008a Devos et al., , 2014 Skevas et al., 2009 Skevas et al., , 2010 Hagedorn et al., 2010) . Pollen barriers act as buffer (separation) zones to minimize cross-pollination. Pollen barriers are field margins planted with non-GM crops of the same species as the GM crops and can be planted around the fields growing either the GM or the non-GM crop. Alternatively, the edges of non-GM fields can be harvested separately and sold as GM crops. Pollen barriers do not need to be as large as separation distances to achieve a similar reduction in cross-fertilization. Generally, one row equals 2 m of isolation distance (Della Porta et al., 2008) .
Except in Romania, growers in the other top five Bt corn-producing countries in Europe can alternatively plant pollen barriers. For example, in Czech Republic and Slovakia, one non-GM border row equates to 2 m of isolation distance; in Portugal, 24 non-GM border rows (GM vs. measures and limits the effective segregating and blending of material to meet quality standards. It has led to excessive gene flow mitigation measures.
Farmers in member states should have a wider choice of coexistence measures that they can use to comply with the GM AP tolerance threshold. The EU-funded Sustainable Introduction of Genetically Modified organisms into European Agriculture project presented a range of measures that could be adopted on the basis decisions made at the local level. These measures consider landscape factors such as farm and field size, the proportion of GM and non-GM crops of the same species, and post-market crop handling methods (Messéan et al., 2009 ).
CASE STudiES: diVERSiTY oF CoEXiSTENCE SYSTEMS
The following three case studies exemplify alternative global approaches to managing coexistence. They reflect different (i) national systems and basic legal and economic principles, (ii) best practices in various supply chains, (iii) conventional) or 28 non-GM border rows plus an isolation distance of 50 m (GM vs. organic) are stipulated. Temporal isolation (differences in corn sowing dates or in maturity class used) is also an option in some member states (Rodrí-guez-Cerezo, 2011). For example, alternatives to isolation distance requirements in Portugal include a minimum of 20 d between the sowing dates of GM and non-GM cultivars of the same Food and Agriculture Organization class or simultaneous sowing of GM and non-GM cultivars that differ by two or more Food and Agriculture Organization classes (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) . This measure, however, is not favoured by Portuguese growers.
In the absence of rapid quantification of GM presence, growers' isolation practices rather than outcomes (amount of GM material in crops) are being mandated. However, pollen-mediated gene flow is only one contributor to AP. Depending on the crop species, volunteerism and seed admixture in the supply chain can be a larger contributor. Lack of quantification provides little opportunity for validating the effectiveness of imposed Table 1 . Isolation distances (m) between genetically modified (GM) and non-GM field crops for ex-ante coexistence measures regulated or proposed in European Union member states (adapted from Ramessar et al. (2010) and Devos et al., 2014 technical measures, and (iv) tolerances and thresholds. The case studies illustrate the diversity in coexistence systems around the world, both in principle and practice.
Europe: Portugal
Portugal has a comprehensive system of coexistence regulations (ex-ante and ex-post) focused on the farmer, including compulsory training courses, anti-cross-pollination measures, and a public compensation fund (Ramessar et al., 2010) . However, its system allows some of the flexibility called for in the criticism on coexistence in the EU (Scholderer and Verbeke, 2012) . Farmers who intend to grow GM corn in Portugal must attend mandatory training courses (Skevas et al., 2010) . Farmers must notify the regional agricultural authority of any GM crop cultivations (GM cultivar, area, place, and intended coexistence measures) and inform their immediate neighbors and the operators with whom they share agricultural machinery by letter. They also have to cooperate with agricultural authorities in all control and monitoring actions by keeping records of their production process (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) . Seed distributors must inform farmers about the coexistence rules, including seed handling and storage guidelines, by means of a leaflet approved by the national agricultural authority and provided with each seed bag. They must also report the farmers that bought GM seeds and the amount purchased to the regional agricultural authority. Regional agricultural authorities must publish farmers' notifications, monitor GM growers, including sampling of neighboring corn crops, and convey all information to the national agricultural authority. Agricultural machinery must be cleaned after the harvest of a GM corn crop by harvesting at least 2000 m 2 (0.2 ha) of a non-GM cultivar, the grain from which will be added to the GM grain (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) .
Technical segregation measures include spatial isolation distances to conventional and organic crops of the same species of 200 and 300 m, respectively; pollen barriers or buffer zones of 24 or more rows of corn (or a combination); or temporal isolation. As noted in the previous section, fixed-width isolation zones greatly affect growers with small fields because proportionally larger isolation areas must exclude conventional corn. For example, with a 200-m isolation zone for an average Portuguese 18-ha field, the surrounding 21 ha must be managed to exclude conventional corn (an area 116% the size of the GM field), compared with a 100-ha field with a 44-ha isolation zone (44% of the field). By comparison, the scientifically justifiable 50-m isolation would require corn to be excluded from 4.5 ha and 10.3 ha (25 and 10% of the field size), respectively. Negotiation with and notification to numerous neighbors might be required. Pollen traps or buffers zones of conventional corn surrounding a GM field, to be harvested and labeled as GM corn, can be managed as a field border by the GM farmers and are smaller than isolation zones. In an average 18-ha field, approximately 16 ha of GM corn could be grown inside the pollen barrier. In the largest corn-growing region (northern Portugal), the ratio of the use of non-GM pollen barriers and buffer zones to isolation distances was 8:1 during the period from 2006 to 2010 (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) .
Portugal allows the voluntary establishment of production zones (areas where all corn is marketed as GM), which makes coexistence easier and less costly and enables small farms (small fields or heterogeneous landscapes) to adopt Bt corn cultivars . Coexistence costs are reduced because isolation measures are only needed along the perimeter between the GM farmers' production zone and their neighbors outside the production zone. In 2010, there were 21 production zones (compared with 11 in 2007), accounting for 46% of Bt corn area and 37% of Bt corn growers (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) . In addition to GM production zones, there are established GM-free areas. One municipality (Lagos) has been recognized as a GM-free zone, with Madeira becoming the first GM-free region in the EU (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) .
A case study of five Bt corn growers, who are members of a 7-yr cooperative, has shown that coexistence regulations do not necessarily lead to increased production costs, provided the regulations are sufficiently flexible (Skevas et al., 2010) . The proximity of the fields of the group members and support from the GM seed supplier, combined with the lack of a price differential between GM and conventional corn, enabled them to avoid segregation measures except with their neighbors outside the zone. Low ex-ante coexistence compliance costs, along with reduced uncertainty owing to the compensation fund for accidental cross-pollination, provided a strong incentive for the farmers to adopt Bt corn. Despite higher seed costs and levies, members of the cooperative achieved a higher gross margin (revenue minus variable costs) by planting GM corn rather than non-GM corn on their farms.
The case study documented by Skevas et al. (2010) demonstrates that flexible ex-ante regulations combined with clear ex-post liability rules, as advocated by , Beckmann et al. (2010) , and Devos et al. (2014) , can prove beneficial for the effective implementation of coexistence regulations in Europe. In reality, GM corn farmers in Portugal do not have to shoulder ex-post tort liability costs (civil damages), as the Ministry of Agriculture and the companies that sell seeds have agreed to cover the cost of damages to neighboring fields (Skevas et al., 2010) . The seed supplier pays into a compensation fund of €4 per 80,000 seeds (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) . These ex-post liability provisions provide an additional incentive to farmers to cultivate GM corn (Scholderer and Verbeke, 2012) . No requests by farmers for compensation have been made since 2007 (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) . attitudes, social pressure, lack of economic incentives or marketing opportunities, may be contributing to low Bt corn adoption rates. In a survey of growers in anticipation of herbicide-resistant corn and oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.), Areal et al. (2012) reported that coexistence measures may influence the decision to adopt the crops in the EU.
South America: Brazil
Coexistence ex-ante regulations and experiences in implementation by Brazilian farmers are summarized by Coelho (2011 Coelho ( , 2012 . In Brazil, the food and feed labeling threshold for GM AP is 1%. There is no threshold for organic production; organic farmers comprise 2% of the farm population. In the 2014-2015 crop year, GM soybean (Glycine max (L.) Merr.), corn, and cotton (Gossypium hirsutum L.) comprised 93, 82, and 66% of the crop area in Brazil, respectively (Fig. 2) .
Brazil is the second-largest GM crop producer (Table  2 ) and the third largest corn producer in the world (78 million t in 2014/2015). Corn was grown on 15 million ha in the 2014-2015 growing season, with 80% of the crop sown with certified seed. Three-quarters of the harvested crop is destined for the livestock feed industry, with 14% exported and 11% used by industry or for human consumption. Coexistence ex-ante regulations (Resolution CTNBio no. 04/07; Colli, 2007) that are specific for commercial fields of corn (insect-or herbicide-resistant or both) include a 100-m isolation distance or 20 m when the GM field is bordered by at least 10 rows of non-GM corn. Distances were established based on national gene flow studies.
In Portugal, the proportion of farmers using more than one coexistence measure varies from 9 to 34%, depending on the region (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) . Even though the system of coexistence is quite complete and strict, it still allows some flexibility in coexistence measures, depending on voluntary agreements among neighbors and according to local conditions. Although 44% of surveyed corn growers (2007) stated that the ex-ante regulations, such as isolation distance, were rigid and difficult to apply, surveys from 2006 to 2010 indicated that over three-quarters of respondents found compliance with coexistence rules to be easy; these results are in accordance with the percentage of respondents who declared their decision to continue Bt corn cultivation, which increased from 57% in 2006 to 88% in 2010 (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) .
Nevertheless, coexistence measures in Portugal may be excessive, as they keep GM AP values far below the 0.9% threshold (Chiarabolli, 2011; Quedas and Carvalho, 2012 ; Fig. 1 ). Adventitious presence was £0.1 and 0.5% in 70 and 97% of samples, respectively; none was above 0.8% (Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) . Based on 5 yr of experience with coexistence in Portugal, Quedas and Carvalho (2012) concluded that Portuguese corn growers have so far (since 2005) experienced coexistence as being feasible and successful. Adaptive behavior and market response appears to circumvent regulatory barriers in areas where growers cooperate. Smaller growers outside the production zones might not have a 'practical choice' because they assume coexistence costs that are disproportionate to their field size and cannot fully access the economic benefits associated with GM crops. The adoption rate of Bt corn since the GM crop was introduced in Spain in 2005 was low in 2010 (4%) but had risen to 32% in 2014 ( James, 2015) . Factors other than coexistence regulations, such as grower Farmers' awareness of the regulations is facilitated by government (e.g., contact with producer associations and other entities linked to agricultural production), and the seed industry (e.g., information on corn seed bags, leaflets and pamphlets, print advertisements, and media coverage). Fields are inspected and fines are levied for noncompliance. Resources are provided for inspector training and for accreditation of laboratories to test seed lots for GM AP. In 2009 -2010 .9% of 1215 inspections nationwide were classified as noncompliant, ranging from 0% in the northern region to 11.3% in the south.
With the rapid adoption of GM corn over time (Fig. 2) , situations requiring coexistence measures with non-GM corn have declined. Organic farms are normally isolated from areas with GM corn cultivation. Generally, fulfilling the 20% refuge area requirement for resistance management in Bt corn was of greater concern to farmers than the coexistence regulations. There is little motivation for segregation in the supply chain, because most of the harvested grain is destined for animal consumption. Cases of voluntary arrangements among farmers to overcome compliance problems (e.g., through the acquisition of product from the non-GM neighbor if unacceptable AP levels are detected) have been noted. However, as in the EU, there have been no reported cases of civil complaint or litigation between neighbors. The main take-home message, as reported by Coelho (2012) , is that neighbors are managing to coexist by themselves quite well.
North America: united States and Canada
The United States and Canada rank first and fifth, respectively, in GM crop production ( Table 2 ). The economic and legal principles of coexistence policy and practice in North America were reviewed by Giroux (2011) . The goal of coexistence in North America is the achievement of IP in specific commodities; in other words, getting the buyer (domestic or international) what they want with minimal AP. The coexistence of agricultural products with specific attributes (functional characteristics) such as specific food or feed uses, specific starch properties, or pedigreed seed varietal purity is well established. Existing coexistence systems have evolved some basic tenets that enable markets to function. The specialty crop of lesser acreage isolates itself from the generic (nonsegregated) commodity. To manage coexistence, the onus is on the specialty crop grower (akin to the GM crop grower in the EU). This responsibility has evolved from open range laws. These laws go back to historical conflicts between livestock and crop producers in the United States in the 20th century, where the burden to erect fences shifted over time from crop to livestock producers as crop production area expanded at the expense of rangeland (Andes, 2000) .
Specialty markets define marketing standards or thresholds to manage the products efficiently and effectively. Specialty supply chains generally cover the full cost of commercialization. Since the specialty crops cost more to produce (isolation, segregation), the costs must be transferable to the end user for the markets to operate. Therefore, customers and consumers must be willing to pay a premium for the differentiated (specialty) food products. Commercial agreements (contracts) should be based on clear, verifiable, and achievable specifications. Standards (e.g., thresholds) need to be commercially relevant and cost-effective to be sustainable.
An example of the coexistence of specialty commodities with their GM counterpart is non-GM IP (food grade) soybean in Canada (reviewed by Anderson, 2011). (>50,000 ha) , trait, and crop (adapted from James, 2015 Genetically modified soybean comprises 80% of the crop area in Canada (Fig. 3) , mainly in southwestern Ontario. Non-GM soybean consistently meets market requirements, ranging from 0.5 to 1.0% for approved GM events. This situation is made easier by the general lack of pollenmediated gene flow and crop volunteerism in the following crop. The market premiums for specialty (non-GM) soybean range from 15 to 60% over the price for commodity (oil crush) GM soybean.
Another North American example is non-GM corn commodities (reviewed by Clarkson, 2011) . In 2014, GM corn comprised 90% of the crop area in Canada (mainly eastern Canada; R. Ripley, Monsanto Canada, personal communication) and 93% of the crop area in the United States (Fig. 4) . Industry contracts the production of selected hybrids. The grower must follow segregation protocols from seed selection and planting through to delivery to the buyer. These protocols include postharvest segregation, third-party testing and verification, and buyer testing. The results to date indicate that the average GM AP in corn supplied from IP programs that test all incoming loads for GM is less than 0.5%. Given the biological characteristics of this crop (i.e., pollen flow and volunteerism), these results suggest that coexistence systems in North America, similar to the experience in Brazil, are working surprisingly well.
Overall, coexistence in North America is industryor market-driven self-regulating, with little government oversight or intervention. Fundamentally, knowing what your neighbor is planning to grow has solved many potential coexistence conflicts. This situation is in contrast with increasing government regulation (with associated administrative costs) and monitoring (e.g., inspections) in Brazil, followed by that in the EU, where regulation seemingly replaces cooperation. In North America, if the grower fails to deliver a product as specified in the production contract, the commodity is simply sold as a generic product or, in extreme cases, is not saleable. Moreover, the grower is penalized as stipulated in the contract. Therefore, the grower has a strong economic incentive to implement appropriate ex-ante coexistence regulations (i.e., specific on-farm best management practices).
RooM FoR CoMPRoMiSE?
Applying all of the social, economic, or legal principles in the EU has resulted in a complex and seemingly conflicting set of coexistence policies among member states. More often than not, the coexistence of GM and non-GM crops has been prohibited for practical purposes (Beckmann, 2011) . Implemented or proposed ex-ante coexistence regulations by member states have been criticized because they do not comply with some key principles established by the EC; the regulations are neither science-based, feasible, proportionate to agricultural structures (e.g., farm and field size, agricultural landscape), nor economically proportionate (i.e., cost-effective) (Demont et al., , 2010a (Demont et al., , 2010b Hagedorn et al., 2010) .
There is an apparently strong negative correlation between stringent or rigid coexistence measures and willingness by growers to adopt GM crops (Rodríguez-Cerezo, 2011) . It is interesting to note that flexible and practical ex-ante coexistence regulations (i.e., pollen barriers as an alternative measure to isolation distance alone or sciencebased isolation distances) correspond with the level of GM corn cultivation in the EU. For example, Spain, which grows most of the Bt corn in the EU, specifies a 50-m isolation distance or, alternatively, the use of pollen barriers. If it is the intent of a national government to discourage cultivation of GM crops, prohibitive or costly coexistence measures are an effective means of implementation. It has been estimated that rigid measures are 10-fold more costly to implement than flexible measures Demont and Devos, 2008) . Thus impracticable regulation may be a barrier to adoption.
Logically, ex-ante coexistence measures should not be more restrictive (i.e., biologically unnecessary, costly or inconvenient) than necessary to ensure that the admixture of GM material with non-GM crops remains below the EU threshold level. Although the EC has emphasized that coexistence measures should not go beyond what is necessary to ensure that the AP of GM material in non-GM crop products remains below the legal labeling threshold, some member states have proposed or adopted measures that aim to keep the amount of GM material present in non-GM crop products as low as possible (Demont et al., 2010a) . Had the European Commission (2010) directive not permitted member states to impose a tolerance threshold of <0.9% in cases where GM AP was deemed to cause economic harm, that policy option would not have been available.
Overall, empowering farmers to decide how best to implement coexistence measures (on a case-by-case basis, as advocated by Demont et al. (2010a) and Devos et al. (2014) ), is consistent with the subsidiarity principle in EC regulation (European Commission, 2003 , 2010 , whereby coexistence should be handled by the lowest authority possible. We share the view of others, such as Hagedorn et al. (2010) , that the farmers involved should be the lowest decision-making authorities, since they usually bear the full economic consequences of GM AP. Cooperative solutions are important, particularly in small-scale farming areas (Consmuller et al., 2009 ) (e.g., via private contractual agreements), allowing farmers to decide the 'who' (GM or non-GM farmer), 'what', 'where' and 'how' specifics of coexistence measures. Flexibility in ex-ante coexistence measures must be coupled with flexible ex-post liability measures, such as the option of buying a neighbor's corn crop if the AP is beyond the threshold (Demont et al., 2010a , Devos et al., 2014 . Authorities may be reluctant to adopt flexible ex-ante regulations because of administrative challenges (Demont and Devos, 2008; Demont et al., 2009 Demont et al., , 2010b , including the inability to measure outcomes. On the other hand, giving more decision-making authority to farmers would help reduce coexistence administration costs.
As outlined previously, some member states such as Portugal provide for the possibility of designating zones or regions in which only GM cultivars of a given crop can be cultivated or where only non-GM cultivars can be cultivated on the basis of voluntary decisions by all affected farmers. Regulations explicitly provide the incentive or opportunity to reduce the coexistence compliance costs through collaboration (e.g., the voluntary grouping of farmers to create production zones exclusively dedicated to the cultivation of GM cultivars) . This kind of collective initiative avoids complicated anticross-pollination measures and expensive duplication of farming operations and facilities (Ramessar et al., 2010) .
Based on the limited commercial introduction of GM crops in the EU, there have been no reports of economic damage or court cases resulting from noncompliance (European Commission, 2009; Rodríguez-Cerezo, 2011; Scholderer and Verbeke, 2012) . It is unclear if the lack of ex-post liability costs are the result of effective or prohibitive coexistence measures in EU member states. Has the pendulum swung too far in imposing excessive ex-ante coexistence measures versus ex-post liability as a deterrent?
CoNCluSioNS
We have touched on the biological and agronomic sensibility of ex-ante coexistence measures in various parts of the world. These measures need to be commensurate with the biology of the crop (particularly the degree of pollen flow and volunteerism) and the GM AP thresholds imposed by governments (e.g., EU and Brazil) or industry (North America). Moreover, transparency (e.g., justification) is required in cases when the GM AP threshold is less than 0.9 (EU) or 1% (e.g., Brazil). Organic crop production is the most problematic, with a 0.9% threshold having been established in the EU (even though it is practically 0.1%; Brookes, 2004) and no threshold in most other parts of the world. Where government regulation and intervention in coexistence implementation is significant, giving farmers more flexibility and decision-making ability in deciding the who, what, where, and how of coexistence measures should not jeopardize the paucity of ex-post liability claims over the past decade. Imposing solutions for an apparently nonexistent problem is illogical, especially when these solutions result in increased costs throughout the supply chain, culminating with the inevitable increased food costs to consumers.
Similar to post-release environmental monitoring (Beckie et al., 2010) , knowledge and experience gained in coexistence worldwide should inform and strengthen future measures or policies. As such, regular monitoring, analysis, and reporting of the efficiency and effectiveness of coexistence measures would be a useful mechanism for iterative learning and adaptation. Grower surveys in EU member states (such as Portugal; Quedas and Carvalho, 2012) and other countries or regions are needed to assess and revise the current ex-ante coexistence regulations as needed. Excessive and scientifically unjustifiable measures need to be weeded out. Additionally, the EC needs to provide more timely and regular reports on the coexistence situation in EU member states (the last report was in 2009), so that policies of member states can be adjusted where appropriate.
